| 1 |
Liability of Government under quasi-contract when formal contract is void (Article 299 & Section 70) |
Contract void for non-compliance with Article 299, but Government liable under Section 70 for benefit enjoyed (unjust enrichment). |
State Of West Bengal V. B.K. Mondal & Sons |
1962 |
Supreme Court (B.P. Sinha CJ & others) |
- |
| 2 |
Scope of “public policy of India” in setting aside arbitral awards |
Arbitral award can be set aside if contrary to fundamental principles of Contract Act. |
Associate Builders V. Delhi Development Authority |
2015 |
Supreme Court (R.F. Nariman, J.) |
- |
| 3 |
When is time of the essence of the contract (Section 55) |
Depends on intention of parties from contract & circumstances. Not automatic from fixed date. |
Welspun Specialty Solutions Ltd. V. Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. |
2021 |
Supreme Court (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud & M.R. Shah, JJ.) |
- |
| 4 |
Measure of damages in case of non-delivery of goods (Section 73) |
Damages = difference between contract price and market price at time & place of delivery. Duty to mitigate. |
Murlidhar Chiranjilal V. Harish Chandra Dwarkadas |
1962 |
Supreme Court (B.P. Sinha CJ & others) |
- |
| 5 |
Whether acceptance of tender creates a concluded contract with Government |
Mere acceptance of tender does not create binding contract. Must comply with Article 299. |
Rajasthan State Electricity Board V. M/S. Mohan Lal |
1967 |
Supreme Court (K.N. Wanchoo CJ & others) |
- |
| 6 |
Rules regarding remoteness of damages for breach of contract |
Damages limited to (1) natural consequences, or (2) those in contemplation of both parties. |
Hadley V. Baxendale |
1854 |
Court of Exchequer, England |
- |
| 7 |
Whether general offer can be accepted by performance (unilateral contract) |
General offer can be accepted by performing the stipulated conditions. |
Carlill V. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. |
1893 |
Court of Appeal, England |
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| 8 |
Formation of contract through acceptance by conduct in tenders |
Acceptance of tender can be by conduct; creates binding contract. |
State Of Bihar V. Lalji Raja & Sons |
1957 |
Supreme Court |
- |
| 9 |
Reciprocal promises and readiness & willingness to perform |
In bilateral contracts, both parties must show readiness and willingness. |
Nathulal V. Phoolchand |
1969 |
Supreme Court (J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswami & A.N. Grover, JJ.) |
- |
| 10 |
Place of contract formation via telephone (repeated case) |
Contract formed at place where acceptance is received by offeror. |
Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia V. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co. |
1966 |
Supreme Court (J.C. Shah, K.N. Wanchoo & M. Hidayatullah, JJ.) |
- |
| 11 |
Unconscionable terms in service rules & public policy (repeated case) |
Unfair terms in unequal bargaining power contracts can be struck down under Section 23. |
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. V. Brojo Nath Ganguly |
1986 |
Supreme Court (D.P. Madon & M.M. Dutt, JJ.) |
- |
| 12 |
Scope of “public policy of India” for setting aside arbitral awards & liquidated damages |
Arbitral award contrary to fundamental principles of Contract Act can be set aside. |
Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. V. Saw Pipes Ltd. |
2003 |
Supreme Court (R.C. Lahoti & Brijesh Kumar, JJ.) |
- |
| 13 |
Whether Government can unilaterally withhold amounts due under other contracts as damages |
No unilateral set-off of damages. Must be adjudicated by court. |
Union Of India V. Raman Iron Foundry |
1974 |
Supreme Court (P.N. Bhagwati, V.R. Krishna Iyer & R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.) |
- |
| 14 |
Validity of consideration – act must be done at the desire of the promisor (Section 2(d)) |
Act done without promisor’s desire does not constitute valid consideration. |
Durga Prasad V. Baldeo |
1880 |
Allahabad High Court |
- |
| 15 |
Requirement of knowledge of offer for acceptance by performance |
Knowledge of the offer is essential. Performance without knowledge does not amount to acceptance. |
Lalman Shukla V. Gauri Dutt |
1913 |
Allahabad High Court (Banerji, J.) |
- |
| 16 |
Forfeiture of earnest money under Section 74 |
Forfeiture subject to Section 74. Only reasonable compensation allowed after proving loss. |
Kailash Nath Associates V. Delhi Development Authority |
2015 |
Supreme Court (T.S. Thakur CJ & V. Ramasubramanian, J.) |
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| 17 |
Whether unfair/unconscionable terms in employment contract can be struck down under Section 23 |
Unfair, unreasonable or oppressive terms in unequal bargaining contracts can be struck down as opposed to public policy. |
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. V. Brojo Nath Ganguly |
1986 |
Supreme Court (D.P. Madon & M.M. Dutt, JJ.) |
- |
| 18 |
Interpretation of conditional & contingent contracts (Sections 31–36) |
Where performance depends on condition precedent which did not occur, no breach. |
Ganga Saran V. Ram Charan Ram Gopal |
1952 |
Supreme Court (Fazl Ali, Mehr Chand Mahajan & Bose, JJ.) |
- |
| 19 |
Enforceability of promise to compensate for past voluntary act (Section 25(2)) |
Promise to compensate for past voluntary service done at promisor’s desire is enforceable without fresh consideration. |
Kedar Nath V. Gorie Mohamed |
1886 |
Calcutta High Court |
- |
| 20 |
Whether consideration can move from a third party under Section 2(d) |
Consideration may proceed from any person (including third party). Stranger to consideration can enforce the promise. |
Chinnaya Rau V. Ramayya |
1882 |
Madras High Court |
- |
| 21 |
Place of formation of contract through instantaneous communication (telephone) |
Contract completed where acceptance is heard/received by offeror. |
Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia V. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co. |
1966 |
Supreme Court (J.C. Shah, K.N. Wanchoo & M. Hidayatullah, JJ.) |
- |
| 22 |
Forfeiture of security deposit on breach under Section 74 |
Forfeiture of security deposit governed by Section 74. Must prove actual loss. |
Maula Bux V. Union Of India |
1969 |
Supreme Court (J.C. Shah CJ, V. Ramaswami & A.N. Grover, JJ.) |
- |
| 23 |
Scope of Section 74 regarding liquidated damages, penalty & forfeiture of earnest money |
Section 74 applies uniformly. Court can award only reasonable compensation, not penalty. |
Fateh Chand V. Balkishan Das |
1963 |
Supreme Court (B.P. Sinha CJ & others) |
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| 24 |
Scope & meaning of “impossibility” under Section 56; doctrine of frustration |
Section 56 is wider than English law. Temporary requisition does not frustrate contract for sale of land. |
Satyabrata Ghose V. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. |
1954 |
Supreme Court (B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose & N.H. Bhagwati, JJ.) |
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| 25 |
Whether a contract by a minor is void or voidable; applicability of estoppel & restitution (Ss. 11, 64, 65, 115) |
Contract by minor is void ab initio. No estoppel against minor. No restitution. Mortgage declared void. |
Mohori Bibee V. Dharmodas Ghose |
1903 |
Privy Council (Lord Macnaghten, Lord Davey, Lord Lindley etc.) |
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| 26 |
1. Whether Clause 9 of the Service Rules, which allowed termination of permanent employees by giving three months’ notice, was valid? 2. Whether such a clause was arbitrary, unreasonable, and opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872? 3. Whether the termination of Brojo Nath Ganguly’s services under this clause was unconstitutional and void? १. क्या सेवा नियमों की धारा 9, जो स्थायी कर्मचारियों को तीन माह का नोटिस देकर हटाने की अनुमति देती थी, वैध थी? २. क्या ऐसा प्रावधा |
A Division Bench of Justice D.P. Madon and Justice A.P. Sen held that Clause 9 was arbitrary, unreasonable, and opposed to public policy. It violated Article 14 of the Constitution and Section 23 of the Contract Act. The termination of Brojo Nath Ganguly’s services was declared void. न्यायमूर्ति डी.पी. मदोन और न्यायमूर्ति ए.पी. सेन की द्वैध पीठ ने माना कि धारा 9 मनमानी, अनुचित और सार्वजनिक नीति के विपरीत थी। यह संविधान के अनुच्छेद 14 और अनुबंध अधिनियम की धारा 23 का उल्लंघन करती थी। Brojo Nath Ganguly की सेवा समाप्ति शून्य घोषित की गई। |
[Case: Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986)] |
6 April 1986 |
Two Judges (Justice D.P. Madon and Justice A.P. Sen) |
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| 27 |
1. Whether a promise to marry contingent on the death of Knight’s father was enforceable? 2. Whether Knight’s act of marrying another woman before his father’s death amounted to anticipatory breach? 3. Whether Frost could sue immediately for breach without waiting for the father’s death? १. क्या Knight के पिता की मृत्यु पर आधारित विवाह का वादा लागू करने योग्य था? २. क्या पिता की मृत्यु से पहले Knight का किसी और से विवाह करना पूर्वानुमानित उल्लंघन (Anticipatory Breach) था? ३. क्या Frost पिता की मृत्यु |
A Division Bench of Chief Justice Cockburn and other judges held that Knight’s conduct amounted to anticipatory breach. Frost was entitled to sue immediately, as the renunciation destroyed the contract’s basis. मुख्य न्यायाधीश Cockburn और अन्य न्यायाधीशों की द्वैध पीठ ने माना कि Knight का आचरण पूर्वानुमानित उल्लंघन था। Frost तुरंत मुकदमा कर सकती थी क्योंकि Knight के त्याग ने अनुबंध की नींव ही समाप्त कर दी थी। |
[Case: Frost v Knight (1872)] |
1872 |
Two Judges Chief Justice Cockburn |
- |
| 28 |
1. Whether the Association’s communication amounted to a binding offer capable of acceptance? 2. Whether there was intention to create legal relations between Blair and the Association? 3. Whether acceptance was validly communicated to form a contract? १. क्या एसोसिएशन का संचार बाध्यकारी प्रस्ताव (Offer) था जिसे स्वीकार किया जा सकता था? २. क्या Blair और एसोसिएशन के बीच कानूनी संबंध बनाने का इरादा था? ३. क्या अनुबंध बनाने के लिए स्वीकृति वैध रूप से संप्रेषित की गई थी? |
The Court held that the communication was not an offer but merely a statement, and therefore no enforceable contract existed. The case reinforced the principle that intention + clear communication of offer and acceptance are essential for contract formation. न्यायालय ने कहा कि संचार प्रस्ताव नहीं बल्कि केवल एक कथन था, इसलिए कोई लागू करने योग्य अनुबंध अस्तित्व में नहीं था। इस मामले ने यह सिद्धांत मजबूत किया कि अनुबंध बनाने के लिए इरादा + प्रस्ताव और स्वीकृति का स्पष्ट संचार आवश्यक है। |
[Cace: Blair v Western Mutual Benefit Association, (1972) 4 WWR 284] |
1972 |
Two Judges Bull, McFarlane, Robertson JJ.A. |
- |
| 29 |
1. Whether two Indian companies can choose a foreign seat of arbitration and foreign law to govern their contract? 2. Whether the Mine Development & Operations Agreement (2009) between Sasan Power Ltd. and NAC India Pvt. Ltd. was validly assignable and enforceable? 3. Whether Indian courts have jurisdiction to restrain arbitration proceedings seated outside India? १. क्या दो भारतीय कंपनियाँ अपने अनुबंध को नियंत्रित करने के लिए विदेशी मध्यस्थता स्थल और विदेशी कानून चुन सकती हैं? २. क्या Sasan Power Ltd. |
A Division Bench of Justice J. Chelameswar and Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre (SC) held that parties are free to choose foreign law and foreign seat of arbitration, even if both are Indian companies. The Court dismissed Sasan Power’s appeal and upheld the validity of ICC arbitration seated in London under UK law. सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने कहा कि पक्षकार स्वतंत्र हैं कि वे विदेशी कानून और विदेशी मध्यस्थता स्थल चुनें, भले ही दोनों भारतीय कंपनियाँ हों। न्यायालय ने Sasan Power की अपील खारिज की और ICC लंदन में UK कानून के तहत मध्यस्थता की वैधता को बरकरार रखा। |
[Case: Sasan Power Ltd. v. North American Coal Corporation India Pvt. Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 8299 of 2016)] |
24 March 2016 – First decision delivered by the Supreme Court 24 August 2016 – Final reported citation / follow up reference in law reports |
Two Judges (Justice J. Chelameswar, Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre) |
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| 30 |
1. Whether a statement of the lowest acceptable price amounts to a binding offer or merely an invitation to treat? 2. Whether communication of “won’t accept less than Rs. 10,000” constituted a counter-offer or a valid offer? 3. Whether there was a concluded contract between Col. Mac Pherson and M.N. Appanna? १. क्या न्यूनतम स्वीकार्य मूल्य बताना बाध्यकारी प्रस्ताव (Offer) है या केवल आमंत्रण (Invitation to treat)? २. क्या “10,000 रुपये से कम स्वीकार नहीं करेंगे” कहना प्रतिप्रस्ताव (Counter-offer) था या व |
The Supreme Court held that no concluded contract existed. A mere statement of the lowest price is not an offer, but only an invitation to negotiate. Since acceptance was not based on a valid legal offer, the agreement was unenforceable. सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने कहा कि कोई पूर्ण अनुबंध नहीं बना था। न्यूनतम मूल्य बताना प्रस्ताव नहीं है, बल्कि केवल बातचीत का आमंत्रण है। चूँकि स्वीकृति वैध प्रस्ताव पर आधारित नहीं थी, समझौता लागू करने योग्य नहीं था। |
[Case: Col. D.I. Mac Pherson v. M.N. Appanna (AIR 1951 SC 184; 1951 SCR 16)] |
9 February 1951 |
Three Judges (Saiyid Fazal Ali, B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.) |
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| 31 |
1. Whether a minor is competent to enter into a contract under the Indian Contract Act, 1872? 2. Whether a mortgage executed by a minor is valid and enforceable? 3. Whether the deed was void under Section 2, 10(5), 11(6) of the Contract Act or not? 4.Whether the defendant was obligated to return the loan amount he had received under the deed or mortgage or not? १. क्या नाबालिग भारतीय अनुबंध अधिनियम, 1872 के अंतर्गत अनुबंध करने में सक्षम है? २. क्या नाबालिग द्वारा किया गया बंधक (Mortgage) वैध और लागू क |
The Privy Council held that a minor’s contract is void ab initio (from the beginning). Dharmodas Ghose, being a minor, was not competent to contract, and the mortgage executed in his favor was invalid. प्रिवी काउंसिल ने कहा कि नाबालिग का अनुबंध प्रारंभ से ही शून्य (Void ab initio) होता है। Dharmodas Ghose नाबालिग होने के कारण अनुबंध करने में सक्षम नहीं था, और उसके द्वारा किया गया बंधक अमान्य था। |
[Case: Mohori Bibee vs Dharmodas Ghose (1903) UKPC 12, (1903) LR 30 IA 114] |
4 March 1903 |
- |
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| 32 |
1. Whether domestic agreements between husband and wife are intended to create legal relations enforceable in court? 2. Whether a promise of maintenance made in a family context amounts to a binding contract? 3. Whether there was a bona fide intention on the part of Mr. Balfour to enter into an agreement with his wife, Mrs. Balfour? 4. Whether a promise or an agreement between Mr. Balfour and Mrs. Balfour can be turned into a contract and be made enforceable? 5. Whether such domestic or social agreement |
The Court held that domestic agreements are not contracts because they lack the intention to create legal relations. The promise made by Mr. Balfour to his wife was a family arrangement, not enforceable in law. न्यायालय ने कहा कि घरेलू समझौते अनुबंध नहीं होते क्योंकि उनमें कानूनी संबंध बनाने का इरादा नहीं होता। श्री Balfour द्वारा पत्नी को किया गया वादा केवल पारिवारिक व्यवस्था था, जिसे कानून में लागू नहीं किया जा सकता। |
[Case: Balfour v. Balfour (1919)] |
25 June 1919 |
Three judges (Lord Justice Warrington, Lord Justice Duke, Lord Justice Atkin) |
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| 33 |
1. Whether a servant who found the missing boy without knowledge of the reward could later claim it? 2. Whether acceptance requires knowledge and communication of the offer? १. क्या सेवक जिसने गुमशुदा लड़के को बिना इनाम की जानकारी के ढूँढा, बाद में इनाम का दावा कर सकता है? २. क्या प्रस्ताव की स्वीकृति के लिए प्रस्ताव की जानकारी और संचार आवश्यक |
The Court held that no contract existed because the plaintiff had no knowledge of the offer when he performed the act. Acceptance requires awareness of the offer. Thus, Lalman Shukla was not entitled to the reward. न्यायालय ने कहा कि कोई अनुबंध अस्तित्व में नहीं था क्योंकि वादी को प्रस्ताव की जानकारी नहीं थी जब उसने कार्य किया। स्वीकृति के लिए प्रस्ताव की जानकारी आवश्यक है। इसलिए, Lalman Shukla इनाम पाने का हकदार नहीं |
[Case: Lalman Shukla vs Gauri Dutt Case Summary (1913)] |
17 April 1913 |
One Judge (Justice Banerji) |
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| 34 |
1. Whether a contract is discharged when performance becomes impossible due to destruction of the subject matter? 2. Whether parties are excused from liability when unforeseen events make performance impossible without fault? १. क्या अनुबंध समाप्त हो जाता है जब उसका पालन असंभव हो जाता है क्योंकि विषय-वस्तु नष्ट हो गई है? २. क्या पक्षकारों को दायित्व से मुक्त किया जा सकता है जब अप्रत्याशित घटनाएँ बिना किसी गलती के पालन को असंभव बना देती हैं? |
The Court held that the contract was frustrated. Since the music hall (subject matter) was destroyed by fire before the concerts could take place, performance became impossible. Thus, both parties were excused from further obligations. न्यायालय ने कहा कि अनुबंध निराश (Frustrated) हो गया। क्योंकि संगीत हॉल (विषय-वस्तु) आग से नष्ट हो गया था और कार्यक्रम नहीं हो सके, पालन असंभव हो गया। इसलिए दोनों पक्षकार आगे की जिम्मेदारियों से मुक्त हो गए। |
[Case: Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309] |
1863 |
Two Judges (Mr Justice Blackburn, Mr Justice Mellor) |
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| 35 |
1. Whether a third party (Dunlop) can enforce a contract made between two other parties (Dew & Selfridge) when Dunlop was not directly a party to that contract? 2. Whether consideration and privity are essential for enforcing contractual rights? १. क्या कोई तीसरा पक्ष (Dunlop) ऐसा अनुबंध लागू कर सकता है जो दो अन्य पक्षों (Dew और Selfridge) के बीच हुआ हो, जबकि Dunlop उस अनुबंध का प्रत्यक्ष पक्षकार नहीं था? २. क्या अनुबंधीय अधिकार लागू करने के लिए प्रतिफल (Consideration) और प्रिविटी (Privity) आवश्यक हैं? |
The House of Lords held that only a party to a contract can sue on it. Dunlop, not being a party to the contract between Dew and Selfridge, could not enforce it. The case reaffirmed the doctrine of privity of contract and the requirement of consideration. लॉर्ड्स ने कहा कि केवल अनुबंध का पक्षकार ही उस पर मुकदमा कर सकता है। Dunlop, Dew और Selfridge के बीच हुए अनुबंध का पक्षकार न होने के कारण, उसे लागू नहीं कर सकता था। इस मामले ने प्रिविटी ऑफ कॉन्ट्रैक्ट और प्रतिफल की आवश्यकता के सिद्धांत को पुनः स्थापित किया। |
[Case: Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd (1915) AC 847 ] |
26 April 1915 |
Multiple Law Lords (including Viscount Haldane LC) |
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| 36 |
1. Whether acceptance sent by post is valid even if delayed due to postal issues? 2. Whether the contract is formed when the acceptance letter is posted or when it is received? १. क्या डाक द्वारा भेजी गई स्वीकृति (Acceptance) वैध होती है, भले ही डाक में देरी हो जाए? २. क्या अनुबंध तब बनता है जब पत्र भेजा जाता है या जब प्राप्त होता है? |
The House of Lords held that the postal rule applies. Acceptance is complete once the letter of acceptance is properly posted, even if it is delayed or lost in transmission. Thus, the contract was binding from the moment of posting. लॉर्ड्स ने कहा कि डाक नियम लागू होता है। स्वीकृति पूरी मानी जाती है जैसे ही पत्र सही तरीके से पोस्ट किया जाता है, चाहे वह देर से पहुँचे या खो जाए। इसलिए अनुबंध पोस्ट करने के समय से ही बाध्यकारी हो जाता है। |
[Case: Dunlop v. Higgins 1848] |
February 24, 1848 |
Multiple Law Lords (including Lord Cottenham LC) |
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| 37 |
1. Whether the postal rule applies to contracts formed through instantaneous communication? 2. Whether acceptance takes effect when sent or when received in cases involving telex or other instantaneous methods of communication, and where the contract is concluded? 3. Whether the decision has implications on determining jurisdiction and applicable law in cross-border contracts formed through instantaneous communication? १. क्या डाक नियम (Postal Rule) तात्कालिक संचार (instantaneous communication) पर लागू ह |
The Court held that the postal rule does not apply to instantaneous communications. Acceptance is effective only when received by the offeror, not when sent. Thus, the contract is formed at the place and time of receipt. न्यायालय ने कहा कि डाक नियम लागू नहीं होता तात्कालिक संचार पर। स्वीकृति तभी प्रभावी होती है जब प्रस्तावक को प्राप्त हो, भेजने पर नहीं। अतः अनुबंध वहीं और उसी समय बनता है जहाँ और जब स्वीकृति प्राप्त होती है। |
[Case: Entores v Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB 327] |
17 May 1955 |
Three judgges |
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Whether signing of discharge voucher/advance receipt amounts to a concluded contract under the Indian Contract Act, thereby barring arbitration? क्या डिस्चार्ज वाउचर/अग्रिम रसीद पर हस्ताक्षर करना भारतीय संविदा अधिनियम के अंतर्गत एक पूर्ण अनुबंध माना जाएगा, जिससे मध्यस्थता (arbitration) का अधिकार समाप्त हो जाता है? |
-The Supreme Court held that mere signing of a discharge voucher does not automatically conclude the contract if allegations of coercion, undue influence, or economic duress exist. -Under Section 13 & 14 ICA, free consent is essential. If consent is obtained under coercion or undue influence, the contract is voidable. -Therefore, arbitration is maintainable to examine whether the discharge voucher was signed voluntarily or under pressure. -सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने कहा कि केवल डिस्चार्ज वाउचर पर हस्ताक्षर करने से अनुबंध स्वतः पूर्ण नहीं हो जाता, यदि दबाव, अनुचित प्रभाव या आर्थिक मजबूरी का आरोप हो। -धारा 13 और 14 ICA के अनुसार स्वतंत्र सहमति आवश्यक है। यदि सहमति दबाव या अनुचित प्रभाव में प्राप्त हुई है, तो अनुबंध शून्यनीय (voidable) होगा। -अतः मध्यस्थता स्वीकार्य है ताकि यह जांचा जा सके कि डिस्चार्ज वाउचर स्वेच्छा से हस्ताक्षरित हुआ या दबाव में। |
[Case:Arabian Exports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. (2025, 495 SC)] |
06 May 2025 |
Two Judges |
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| 39 |
Whether derivative contracts entered under ISDA Master Agreement were valid and enforceable, and whether restitution/refund could be claimed under the Indian Contract Act when such contracts caused losses? क्या ISDA मास्टर एग्रीमेंट के अंतर्गत किए गए डेरिवेटिव कॉन्ट्रैक्ट्स वैध और लागू करने योग्य थे, और क्या ऐसे कॉन्ट्रैक्ट्स से हुए नुकसान पर भारतीय संविदा अधिनियम के अंतर्गत प्रतिपूर्ति/रिफंड का दावा किया जा सकता है? |
The Supreme Court held that derivative contracts are valid commercial transactions under law, and parties cannot escape liability merely by claiming ignorance. Refund or restitution is not permissible if the contracts were entered knowingly and losses occurred due to market risks. सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने कहा कि डेरिवेटिव कॉन्ट्रैक्ट्स वैध वाणिज्यिक लेन-देन हैं, और पक्षकार केवल अज्ञानता का दावा करके देयता से बच नहीं सकते। यदि कॉन्ट्रैक्ट्स जानबूझकर किए गए हों और बाज़ार जोखिमों के कारण नुकसान हुआ हो, तो रिफंड या प्रतिपूर्ति स्वीकार्य नहीं है। |
[Case: M/s Rajshree Sugars and Chemicals v. M/s Axis Bank Limited (2019) |
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-Whether there should be forfeiture of earnest money in the present facts? -What are the principles governing award of damages and compensation under Section 74 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA)? -क्या वर्तमान तथ्यों में अर्नेस्ट मनी की जप्ती होनी चाहिए? -भारतीय संविदा अधिनियम, 1872 (ICA) की धारा 74 के तहत नुकसान और मुआवजे के पुरस्कार को नियंत्रित करने वाले सिद्धांत क्या हैं? |
The Supreme Court held that forfeiture of earnest money is not valid unless there is a breach of contract. Section 74 applies only when a contract is broken, and compensation must be reasonable. सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने कहा कि अर्जित धन की ज़ब्ती तब तक वैध नहीं है जब तक अनुबंध का उल्लंघन न हो। धारा 74 केवल अनुबंध टूटने की स्थिति में लागू होती है और क्षतिपूर्ति उचित होनी चाहिए। |
[Case: M/S. KAILASH NATH ASSOCIATES VS DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; C.A. No.-000193-000193 – 2015] |
09-Jan-2015 |
Two Judges |
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| 41 |
Whether refund/compensation can be claimed when telecom licenses were quashed as illegal, and whether restitution under Section 65/72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is applicable? क्या दूरसंचार लाइसेंसों को अवैध घोषित किए जाने पर रिफंड/मुआवज़े का दावा किया जा सकता है, और क्या भारतीय संविदा अधिनियम, 1872 की धारा 65/72 के अंतर्गत प्रतिपूर्ति लागू होती है? |
The Supreme Court held that no refund or restitution is permissible since the licenses were obtained through a process tainted with illegality. The principle of unjust enrichment and public policy bars such claims. सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने यह निर्णय दिया कि कोई रिफंड या प्रतिपूर्ति स्वीकार्य नहीं है, क्योंकि लाइसेंस अवैध प्रक्रिया से प्राप्त किए गए थे। अनुचित लाभ और जननीति (Public Policy) का सिद्धांत ऐसे दावों को रोकता है। |
[Case: Loop Telecom and Trading Limited v. Union of India (2022); C.A. No.-001447-001467 - 2016] |
03-March, 2022 |
Three Judges |
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| 42 |
Whether claim for refund is tenable in any of the proceedings for any period based on Section 72 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA) if the assessee has “passed on” the liability to the consumer or third party? क्या किसी भी कार्यवाही में, किसी भी अवधि के लिए, भारतीय संविदा अधिनियम, 1872 (ICA) की धारा 72 के आधार पर रिफंड का दावा स्वीकार्य है यदि करदाता (assessee) ने यह देयता उपभोक्ता या किसी तृतीय पक्ष को "स्थानांतरित" कर दी है? |
The Supreme Court held that refund is not permissible if the liability has been passed on to the consumer/third party, as it would amount to unjust enrichment. Section 72 of ICA cannot override this principle. सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने यह निर्णय दिया कि रिफंड स्वीकार्य नहीं है यदि देयता उपभोक्ता/तृतीय पक्ष को स्थानांतरित कर दी गई है, क्योंकि यह अनुचित लाभ (Unjust Enrichment) होगा। भारतीय संविदा अधिनियम की धारा 72 इस सिद्धांत को निरस्त नहीं कर सकती। |
[Case: WELSPUN SPECIALTY SOLUTIONS LIMITED THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE VS OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. THROUGH ITS COMPANY SECRETARY;CA NOs. 2826-2827 OF 2016 WITH OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. VS REMI METALS GUJARAT LTD; CA NO. |
13-Nov-2021 |
Two Judges |
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| 43 |
Whether claim for refund is tenable in any of the proceedings for any period based on Section 72 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA) if the assessee has “passed on” the liability to the consumer or third party? क्या किसी भी कार्यवाही में, किसी भी अवधि के लिए, भारतीय संविदा अधिनियम, 1872 (ICA) की धारा 72 के आधार पर रिफंड का दावा स्वीकार्य है यदि करदाता (assessee) ने यह देयता उपभोक्ता या किसी तृतीय पक्ष को "स्थानांतरित" कर दी है? |
The Supreme Court said that all refund claims for indirect taxes like excise or customs must follow the law’s procedure (such as Section 11B of the Central Excise Act). Refund cannot be claimed directly by filing a suit or writ. The rule of unjust enrichment applies: if the tax burden was passed to consumers, the assessee cannot get refund. Article 265 does not mean every illegal tax is automatically refunded; refund depends on legal conditions and proof that the assessee bore the tax. Civil suits and writs are allowed but only within the limits of the statutory scheme, not as a shortcut. सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने कहा कि अप्रत्यक्ष करों (जैसे उत्पाद शुल्क/सीमा शुल्क) की वापसी केवल कानून में दी गई प्रक्रिया (जैसे केंद्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा 11B) से ही की जा सकती है। सीधे दीवानी वाद या रिट से वापसी नहीं मिलेगी। अनुचित समृद्धि का सिद्धांत लागू होगा: यदि कर का बोझ उपभोक्ताओं पर डाल दिया गया है तो करदाता को वापसी नहीं मिलेगी। अनुच्छेद 265 का अर्थ यह नहीं है कि हर अवैध कर स्वतः वापस होगा; वापसी तभी होगी जब कानूनी शर्तें पूरी हों और करदाता ने वास्तव में कर का बोझ उठाया हो। दीवानी वाद और रिट याचिकाएँ पूरी तरह निषिद्ध नहीं हैं, लेकिन वे वैधानिक ढांचे के अधीन हैं और उसका उल्लंघन करके शॉर्टकट नहीं लिया जा सकता। |
[Case: Mafatlal Industries Ltd, Ahmedabad v. Union of India1997 (5) SCC 536 ] |
19 December 1996 |
Nine Judge Constitution Bench |
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1. Whether SARFAESI Act Section 11 applies to inter-se disputes between banks regarding priority of security interest without written arbitration agreement? 2. Whether borrower’s breach of credit facility agreement clause (prohibiting subsequent pledge without prior consent) creates enforceable priority rights for first creditor? 3. Jurisdiction of DRT vs Arbitration under SARFAESI for contractual disputes between secured creditors. 1. क्या SARFAESI अधिनियम की धारा 11 लिखित मध्यस्थता समझौते के बिना बैंकों क |
Held by Justice B.V. Nagarathna & Justice Augustine George Masih: SARFAESI Section 11 doesn’t cover inter bank priority disputes without arbitration; only DRT has jurisdiction. Contract clauses can’t override statutory priority. Second pledge valid but subject to SARFAESI registration. Bank’s appeal dismissed. न्यायमूर्ति बी.वी. नागरत्ना व न्यायमूर्ति ऑगस्टिन जॉर्ज मसीह ने कहा कि SARFAESI धारा 11 बिना मध्यस्थता समझौते के अंतर बैंक प्राथमिकता विवादों पर लागू नहीं होती; ऐसे मामलों पर केवल DRT का अधिकार है। अनुबंध शर्तें कानूनी प्राथमिकता नहीं बदल सकतीं। दूसरी गिरवी वैध है पर SARFAESI पंजीकरण पर निर्भर। बैंक की अपील खारिज। |
[Case: Bank of India Vs. M/s. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.] |
23 May 2025 |
Tow judges |
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